Fawcett (2010: xxii-xxiii):
Where does this leave the representations of clause structure in IFG and the many derived works? It may be argued by some that the main value of such 'multiple structure' representations is that they provide the best available description of a language that foregrounds the concept that each clause is the realisation of several different broad types of meaning (or 'metafunctions', in Halliday's terms). On the other hand, a representation of the clause that shows (1) the various different types of meaning that it expresses at the level of semantics and (2) a single structure at the level of form provides an equally insightful representation of this important aspect of language, and presents no additional problems for the theory. Moreover it is in fact easier, in a fully generative SF grammar, to generate the final structures directly from the system networks than it is to do it via a 'multiple structure' representation. Chapter 7 includes an example of the alternative way of representing the many meanings in a clause, i.e., by showing the semantic features in their 'strands of meaning'. In this approach, then, there is no 'intermediate' structure, and the representation of syntax at the level of form is the final structure.
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[1] This is demonstrably false. A representation of the clause that treats function as semantic and form as lexicogrammar is not 'equally insightful', and does indeed present additional problems for the theory.
The most serious resultant additional problem and lack of insight is the absence of a rich and systematic account of grammatical metaphor, as when, in the simplest of examples, a process (semantics) is realised as a participant (grammar). Grammatical metaphor was the principal motivation for the stratification of the content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar, each with its own system–structure cycle (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 429). The importance of grammatical metaphor as a phenomenon includes the fact that it made scientific registers possible (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 545).
It will also be seen later that another shortcoming of the simpler Cardiff model is that it requires the export of much meaning out of semantics (and language) to 'knowledge of the world'. This makes it a far less efficient theory — since it has less explanatory potential — as well as making it inconsistent with a fundamental tenet of SFL theory — that, in a semiotic theory of language, 'knowledge' is meaning.
[2] This demonstrates the motivation for Fawcett's simpler model: the ease of generating structures from systems, rather than providing a rich explanatory model of the complexity of language.
[3] This continues the unsupported assertion that the metafunctional function structures of the clause are "intermediate" structures. This is another instance of the logical fallacy of proof by (repeated) assertion.
The most serious resultant additional problem and lack of insight is the absence of a rich and systematic account of grammatical metaphor, as when, in the simplest of examples, a process (semantics) is realised as a participant (grammar). Grammatical metaphor was the principal motivation for the stratification of the content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar, each with its own system–structure cycle (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 429). The importance of grammatical metaphor as a phenomenon includes the fact that it made scientific registers possible (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 545).
It will also be seen later that another shortcoming of the simpler Cardiff model is that it requires the export of much meaning out of semantics (and language) to 'knowledge of the world'. This makes it a far less efficient theory — since it has less explanatory potential — as well as making it inconsistent with a fundamental tenet of SFL theory — that, in a semiotic theory of language, 'knowledge' is meaning.
[2] This demonstrates the motivation for Fawcett's simpler model: the ease of generating structures from systems, rather than providing a rich explanatory model of the complexity of language.
[3] This continues the unsupported assertion that the metafunctional function structures of the clause are "intermediate" structures. This is another instance of the logical fallacy of proof by (repeated) assertion.
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