Tuesday 20 April 2021

Fawcett's Argument Against 'Secondary Structure'

Fawcett (2010: 219):
A more general reason why we should expect the use of the concept of 'secondary structure' to wither away in modern SF grammars is that we now have much fuller functional descriptions of languages than those that were available when Halliday was writing "Categories". The result is that it no longer feels adequate simply to label all the elements that precede the head in a nominal group as a single 'modifier', or to label all the thematised elements in a case of multiple Theme as a single Theme. In IFG, for example, we would not find a nominal group such as that lovely porcelain vase from China that you broke last week me [sic] being analysed as if it had just three elements of structure at the 'primary' degree of delicacy (i.e., Modifier, Head and Qualifier, as these terms are used in "Categories"). Instead it would be analysed immediately into its supposedly 'secondary' structure, i.e., as having (in IFG terms) a Deictic, an Epithet, a Classifier, a Head and two Qualifiers.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously explained, the concept of a more delicate 'secondary structure' was a feature of Halliday's superseded theory, Scale & Category Grammar (1961), and does not feature in SFL Theory.

[2] To be clear, having "much fuller functional descriptions of languages" is irrelevant to the theoretical principle of delicacy of structure in Halliday (1961). Halliday originally proposed the notion of delicacy of structure (elaboration) to distinguish it from the compositional rank scale (extension). However, with the development of SFL Theory, it became clear that the organising principle was not delicacy (elaboration), but composition (extension), though applied to functional elements, not formal constituents (the rank scale).

[3] To be clear, on the one hand, here Fawcett has become confused, switching his argument against 'secondary structure' to an argument against 'primary structure' ("a single Modifier", "a single Theme"). On the other hand, the "argument" — "it no longer feels adequate" — is merely a personal attitudinal evaluation, not an instance of reasoning on the basis of evidence; see [4] and [5].

[4] To be clear, on the one hand, the reason why a 'Categories' analysis would not appear in IFG is because IFG is an exposition of the current theory: Systemic Functional Grammar (1994), whereas Categories is an exposition of the superseded theory: Scale & Category Grammar (1961). On the other hand, Fawcett is again arguing against what he believes is a primary structure, while purporting to be arguing against what he takes to be secondary structure.

[5] This is misleading, because it misapplies SFL Theory as expounded in IFG. On the one hand, Fawcett misrepresents an experiential structure as a secondary structure of logical structure — while placing a logical element (Head) in an experiential structure. On the other hand, Fawcett neglects to mention how the logical structure is expanded, or how the two Qualifiers differ in terms of the constituency of the nominal group:


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